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Human Rights Approach to Intellectual Property 
Protection: The Genesis and Application of Sub-
Commission Resolution 2000/7 
David Weissbrodt** and Kell Schoff*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 17, 2000, the United Nations Sub-Commission 
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (the Sub-
Commission) adopted Resolution 2000/7, entitled “Intellectual 
Property Rights and Human Rights”.1  This resolution signified 
the Sub-Commission’s belief that international intellectual 
property regimes were not adequately  accounting for human 
rights norms.2  Resolution 2000/7 called on U.N. Member 
States, intergovernmental bodies, and various U.N. entities to 
reaffirm their commitments toward the achievement of 
international human rights norms, adopt a human rights 
approach to the development of international intellectual 
property regimes, and further study the interaction between 
intellectual property protection and human rights.3 
This article will first examine how the seemingly disparate 
interests of trade and globalization, intellectual property 
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U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.  
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sponsored by the human rights and intellectual property sections of the AALS.  
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Dan Burk, Sara Dillon, 
Kate Glover, Larry Helfer, Peter Jaszi, Ruth Okediji, and Patricia Schaffer in 
preparing this article.  This article was also published in volume 22 of the 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights. 
*** University of Minnesota Law School, class of 2004. 
 1. Sub-Commission on Human Rights Res. 2000/7, Intellectual property 
rights and human rights, ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 52nd Sess., 
25th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/Res/2000/7 (2000) [hereinafter Resolution 
2000/7]. 
 2. Id. at ¶ 2. 
 3. Id. at ¶¶ 4-15. 
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protection, and human rights norms ultimately  converged 
through the adoption of Resolution 2000/7.  It will then review 
efforts to modify global trade and finance in light of human 
rights concerns, including what steps have been taken by the 
U.N. and other international norm-setting institutions in 
response to the Sub-Commission’s call for increased awareness 
and integration of human rights norms into intellectual 
property protection regimes.  Finally, it will summarize what 
the Sub-Commission hopes will be its next steps in promoting a 
human rights approach to international intellectual property 
protection and trade liberalization. 
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II. ELEMENTS LEADING TO THE ADOPTION OF 
RESOLUTION 2000/7  
A. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
A brief review of a few key international agreements will 
help to frame the rationale behind Resolution 2000/7’s call for 
the integration of human rights norms into intellectual 
property protection schemes. 
1.  Human Rights Treaties 
In Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),4 the States Parties to the 
Covenant “recognize the right of everyone . . . [both] to enjoy 
the benefits of scientific progress and its applications”, on the 
one hand, and to “benefit from the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or 
artistic production of which he is the author”, on the other.5  
Hence, international human rights law recognizes the rights of 
inventors and authors while simultaneously focusing on the 
public right to benefit from their inventions and works of art.  
Article 15 does not, however, indicate how a balance might be 
struck between the creators, the economic interests that 
acquire their intellectual property, and the beneficiaries of 
creativity.6 
Nevertheless, the ICESCR does contain several other 
provisions bearing upon access to the fruits of inventions.  In 
Article 11, States Parties to the Covenant “recognize the right 
of everyone to an adequate standard of living . . . including 
adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions.”7  Further, States Parties 
recognize in Article 11 “the fundamental right of everyone to be 
free from hunger . . . [and accordingly agree to] improve 
methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by 
making full use of technical and scientific knowledge”.8  In 
Article 12, the States Parties to the ICESCR also “recognize the 
 
 4. G.A. Res. 2200A , International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 
(1966) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 5. Id. at art. 15(1). 
 6. See id. at arts. 1-31. 
 7. Id. at art. 11(1). 
 8. Id. at art. 11(2). 
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right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health” that shall be achieved 
by the “prevention, treatment and control . . . of diseases” as 
well as the “creation of conditions which would assure to all 
medical service and medical attention in the event of 
sickness.”9 
There is another balancing process between the rights of 
inventors or owners of inventions under Article 15 and the 
rights of the hungry, ill-housed, or the sick who are protected 
under Articles 11 and 12.  Article 2 of the ICESCR provides 
some guidance as to how governments should achieve these 
rights.  Under Article 2, States Parties only agree to “take 
steps . . . to the maximum of available resources, with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in” Articles 11, 12, and 15 of the ICESCR.10 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
the authoritative interpreter of the ICESCR, has provided 
specific guidance on how to implement the general and 
potentially conflicting responsibilities of States Parties.11  The 
Committee has declared that States Parties have a “minimum 
core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, 
minimum essential levels of each of the rights”.12  In particular, 
the Committee “emphasize[d] that any intellectual property 
regime that makes it more difficult for a State party to comply 
with its core obligations in relation to health, food, [or] 
education . . . is inconsistent with the legally binding 
obligations of the State party.”13  The Committee’s statement 
reminded States Parties of the “importance of the integration of 
international human rights norms into the enactment and 
 
 9. Id. at art. 12(1)-(2). 
 10. Id. at art. 2(1) (asserting the obligations of States Parties to work for 
the full realization of the rights recognized in the Convention). 
 11. See The nature of States parties obligations (Art. 2, par. 1 of the 
Covenant), Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment No. 3, 5th Sess., ¶ 10 (1990) [hereinafter The nature of States parties 
obligations], in Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5 at 18 (2001) [hereinafter Compilation].  See also, 
Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Economic and Social 
Council, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 27th Sess., 
Agenda item 3, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/15 (2001) [hereinafter Substantive 
Issues Arising in the Implementation of the Covenant]. 
 12. The nature of States parties obligations, supra note 11, at ¶ 10. 
 13. Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the Covenant, 
supra note 11, at ¶ 12. 
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interpretation of intellectual property law” in a balanced 
manner that protects “public and private interests in 
knowledge” without infringing on fundamental human rights.14 
A second major human rights treaty relevant to 
understanding the nexus between human rights and 
intellectual property, particularly with respect to copyright, is 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Civil 
and Political Covenant).15  Article 19(2) of the Civil and 
Political Covenant provides that “[e]veryone shall have the 
right to freedom of expression . . . includ[ing] freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas . . . either orally, in 
writing or in print”.16  Article 19(3), however, allows 
governments to place substantial restrictions on the broad 
rights in Article 19(2) in so far as those limitations are 
“provided by law and are necessary . . . [f]or the protection of 
national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public 
health or morals.”17  Unlike the robust and primary freedom of 
speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution,18 the heavily restricted freedom of expression 
granted by Article 19 of the Civil and Political Covenant affords 
much less basis for arguing that freedom of expression should 
trump or narrow copyright.19  Nonetheless, it has been 
suggested that Article 19 could support an international right 
to fair use, just as the First Amendment does in the United 
States.20 
 
 14. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18. 
 15. G.A. Res. 2200A, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered 
into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter Civil and Political Covenant]. 
 16. Id. at art. 19(2). 
 17. Id. at art. 19(3). 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 19. See Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 15, at art. 19. 
 20. It is unclear, however, whether a prohibition on fair use might 
arguably fit within the need to protect “national security or of public order 
(ordre public), or of public health or morals.”  Civil and Political Covenant, 
supra note 15, at art. 19(3).  While the concepts of “national security and 
public order” have been expansively interpreted in the past couple of years, it 
is uncertain whether they could be used as a basis for establishing an 
appropriate balance between copyright and freedom of expression.  See also 
infra section II.A(2) for a discussion on the ordre public clause in the TRIPS 
agreement. 
There is also a danger in relying too heavily on U.S. precedent pertaining to 
fair use and the First Amendment.  Two recent copyright cases signal a 
narrowing of the scope of protection for expression available under the fair use 
doctrine.  In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, the Second Circuit hinted 
at the potential vulnerability of the fair use defense when it noted that “the 
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Based on language similar to the Civil and Political 
Covenant’s Article 19, the European Convention on Human 
Rights21 informs a human rights approach to intellectual 
property protection.  Article 10(1) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights recognizes that “[e]veryone has the right to 
freedom of expression” which includes “freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers.”22  The freedom of expression, however, is heavily 
circumscribed by Article 10(2), which states that “[t]he exercise 
of these freedoms . . . may be subject to such formalities, 
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, [and] for the protection of the reputation or the rights 
of others”.23 
 
Supreme Court has never held that fair use is constitutionally required”.  
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 458 (2nd Cir. 2001).  
Although the Universal City Studios court conceded that “some isolated 
statements in [the Supreme Court’s] opinions might arguably be enlisted for [a 
fair use] requirement”, the Second Circuit’s emphatic assertion that “the 
DMCA [Digital Millennium Copyright Act] does not impose even an arguable 
limitation on the opportunity to make a variety of traditional fair uses of DVD 
movies” indicates that U.S. judges are not particularly receptive to fair use 
arguments that attempt to invalidate current copyright protection laws.  Id. at 
458-59. 
In Eldred v Ashcroft, the Supreme Court recently confirmed the difficulty of 
using fair use as a tool to challenge the constitutionality of federal copyright 
legislation.  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).  In upholding the 
constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act, the Supreme Court 
declined to impose the “uncommonly strict scrutiny on a copyright scheme that 
incorporates its own speech-protective purposes and safeguards.”  Id. at 219.  
It reasoned that because the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment to 
the Constitution were “adopted close in time . . . copyright’s limited 
monopolies are compatible with free speech principles.”  Id.  The Supreme 
Court went on to state that “[t]he First Amendment securely protects the 
freedom to make–or decline to make–one’s own speech; it bears less heavily 
when speakers assert the right to make other people’s speeches.”  Id. at 191. 
In light of the narrow scope of fair use seen in Universal City Studios and 
Eldred, advocates of a human rights approach to intellectual property rights 
should be wary of relying too heavily on U.S. precedent to buttress an 
argument for a right to fair use under Article 19 of the Civil and Political 
Covenant. 
 21. The European Convention on Human Rights, Council of Europe, 
(1950), available at http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html#C.SecV (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2003). 
 22. Id. at § 1, art. 10(1). 
 23. Id. at § 1, art. 10(2). 
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The Article 10 freedom of expression argument was 
recently raised in an unsuccessful challenge to English 
copyright law.  In Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd.,24 a 
newspaper publisher that had printed verbatim excerpts from a 
politician’s personal diaries attempted to avoid liability for 
copyright infringement by arguing that the Article 10 freedom 
of expression trumped the copyright protection provided by the 
English Copyright, Patents and Designs Act (CPDA).25  The 
English Court of Appeal rejected that contention, reasoning 
that, because “[t]he needs of a democratic society include the 
recognition and protection of private property . . . [which] 
includes copyright[,]” there was “no reason why the provisions 
of the [CPDA] should not be sufficient to give effect to the 
Convention [Article 10] right subject only to such restrictions 
as are permitted by Article 10.2.”26  Although Article 10 
protection for freedom of expression did not control in this 
particular case, the Court of Appeal nonetheless acknowledged 
the following: 
[R]are circumstances can arise where the right of freedom of 
expression will come into conflict with the protection afforded by the 
[CPDA], notwithstanding the express exceptions to be found in the 
[CPDA].  In these circumstances, we consider that the court is 
bound . . . to apply the [CPDA] in a manner that accommodates the 
right of freedom of expression.27 
This dictum indicates that courts may in some contexts 
take human rights norms into account when ruling on 
intellectual property litigation.28 
2. International Intellectual Property Protection: The TRIPS 
Agreement 
In adopting Resolution 2000/7, the Sub-Commission 
expressed a fundamental concern that the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property29 does not 
 
 24. The Right Honourable Paddy Ashdown MP PC v. Telegraph Group 
Ltd., 2001 EWCA Civ. 1142 (Eng. C.A.) available at 
http://www.courtservice.gov.uk/judgmentsfiles/j677/civil_ashdown.htm (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2003). 
 25. Id. at ¶ 15. 
 26. Id. at ¶ 38. 
 27. Id. at ¶ 45. 
 28. For more extensive discussion of the Ashdown case and its 
implications, see generally Louis Joseph, Human Rights Versus Copyright: The 
Paddy Ashdown Case, 13 ENT. L. REV. 72 (2002); Amos Merris, Can We Speak 
Freely Now? Freedom of Expression under the Human Rights Act, 6 EUR. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 750 (2002). 
 29. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
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adequately recognize human rights norms.30  Resolution 2000/7 
reads in part: 
Noting . . . that actual or potential conflicts exist between the 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the realization of 
economic, social and cultural rights in relation to, inter alia, 
impediments to the transfer of technology to developing countries, the 
consequences for the enjoyment of the right to food of plant variety 
rights and the patenting of genetically modified organisms, “bio-
piracy” and the reduction of communities’ (especially indigenous 
communities’) control over their own genetic and natural resources 
and cultural values, and restrictions on access to patented 
pharmaceuticals and the implications for the enjoyment of the right 
to health, 
. . . . 
Declares . . . that since the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement 
does not adequately reflect the fundamental nature and indivisibility 
of all human rights . . . there are apparent conflicts between the 
intellectual property rights regime embodied in the TRIPS 
Agreement, on the one hand, and international human rights law, on 
the other.31 
Since TRIPS is such a central focus of the Sub-
Commission’s concern, it is appropriate to present a brief 
overview of the TRIPS Agreement.  The Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights was a product 
of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariff and 
Trade (GATT) held in 1994.32  Broadly speaking, TRIPS 
extended intellectual property rights by endowing the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) with the power to impose reciprocal 
trade sanctions.33  TRIPS requires that WTO States protect 
intellectual property by enacting national legislation and 
regulatory procedures.34 
 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization [hereinafter WTO], Annex 1C; LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF 
THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS 
Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-
trips.pdf. (last visited Dec. 2, 2003). 
 30. Resolution 2000/7, supra note 1, at preface & ¶ 9. 
 31. Id. at preface & ¶2. 
 32. ROBERT P. MERGES ET. AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 319-20 (2d ed. 2000). 
 33. The preface of TRIPS outlines a desire to “reduce distortions and 
impediments to international trade . . . [by] taking into account the need to 
promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, 
and . . . ensur[ing] that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual 
property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.”TRIPS 
Agreement, supra note 29, at preface.  It also recognizes the need for “new 
rules and disciplines concerning . . . the provision of effective and appropriate 
means for the enforcement of trade-related intellectual property rights.”  Id. 
 34. “Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement.”  
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TRIPS recognizes that nations will have different policy 
goals with respect to the scope of intellectual property 
protection depending on their respective levels of 
development.35  Article 7 notes that “protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to 
the promotion of technological innovation”.36  At the same time, 
this protection should also contribute to the “social and 
economic welfare”.37  Article 8 explicitly mentions that WTO 
States may take into account the protection “of public health 
and nutrition, and . . . promot[ion of] the public interest in 
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development” when tailoring their intellectual 
property regimes to the norms mandated by TRIPS.38  These 
provisions reveal a fundamental tension in TRIPS between the 
economic interests of intellectual property rights holders, on 
the one hand,39 and state and public interests in promoting 
public health and economic development, on the other.40 
This tension is reiterated in the specific context of patent 
protection in TRIPS Articles 27, 28, 30, and 31.41  Article 28 
forms the general rule extending exclusive protection to patent 
holders.42  Article 27, however, permits governments to 
“exclude from patentability” any inventions in order to “protect 
 
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, at art. 1.1.  “Members shall be free to 
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this 
Agreement within their own legal system and practice.”  Id. 
 35. TRIPS prefaces its substantive articles with a recognition of “the 
special needs of the least-developed country Members in respect of maximum 
flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws and regulations in order to 
enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.”  TRIPS 
Agreement, supra note 29, at preface. 
 36. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, at art. 7. 
 37. Id. 
 38. “Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and 
regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect health and nutrition, and to 
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development, provided that such measures are 
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.”  TRIPS Agreement, supra 
note 29, at art. 8.1. 
 39. The patent protection system in most developed countries typically 
encourages innovation by providing an economic incentive, in the form of a 
limited term monopoly on the production and sale of the patentable subject 
matter.  In the United States, this policy is rooted in the text of the 
Constitution, which authorizes Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of . . . 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their . . . Discoveries.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 40. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, at arts. 8, 27 & 28. 
 41. See id. at arts. 27, 28, 30 & 31. 
 42. Id. at art. 28.1(a). 
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ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the 
environment”.43  Furthermore, Article 30 describes broad 
parameters within which it is acceptable for member states to 
intrude on the exclusivity of patent rights: 
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights 
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not 
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent 
owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.44 
Article 31 specifies the threshold conditions and limitations 
that must be satisfied if a State wishes to derogate from the 
exclusivity of the patent protection afforded by Article 28.45  
Before allowing the use of the subject matter of a patent 
without the authorization of the patent holder, a government 
must first attempt to “obtain authorization from the right 
holder on reasonable commercial terms.”46  This requirement, 
however, can be waived “in the case of national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public 
non-commercial use.”47  Even if such exigent circumstances 
exist, however, the government must limit “the scope and 
duration of such use . . . to the purpose for which it was 
authorized”.48  Furthermore, such use is to be “terminated if 
and when the circumstances which led to . . . [the unauthorized 
use] cease to exist and are unlikely to recur.”49  Hence, Articles 
30 and 31 frame the balance of interests between intellectual 
property rights of patent holders, Member States, and the 
public at large. 
TRIPS’ copyright protection primarily guards the copyright 
interests of literary and artistic creators from developed 
nations.50  Gaps exist in the copyright protection provided for 
artistic and literary manifestations of traditional knowledge 
and indigenous culture.51  TRIPS incorporates Articles 1-21 of 
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
 
 43. Id. at art. 27.2. 
 44. Id. at art. 30. 
 45. Id. at arts. 28 & 31. 
 46. Id. at art. 31(b). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at art. 31(c). 
 49. Id. at art. 31(g). 
 50. See generally Srividhya Ragavan, Vol. 2 No. 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP. 
REV. 1 (2001) (describing protection of traditional knowledge and indigenous 
culture). 
 51. See id. at 17-19. 
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Works52 as the basis for TRIPS copyright protection.53  The 
language of the Berne Convention does provide some protection 
for works that encompass traditional knowledge and 
indigenous culture.54  Significantly though, TRIPS does not 
include the rights and obligations under Berne Convention 
Article 6bis, which confers moral rights upon copyright 
holders.55  The refusal to recognize moral rights of authors 
partially explains why some indigenous artists have difficulty 
in protecting their creations from undesirable modifications or 
uses.56  Furthermore, the remaining TRIPS copyright 
provisions focus on rights involving computer programs, 
cinematographic works, sound recordings, and broadcasting.57  
These TRIPS provisions are more valuable to copyright holders 
in developed nations than to literary and artistic creators 
seeking to protect traditional knowledge and indigenous 
cultural rights. 
Intellectual property protection under TRIPS benefits from 
the enforcement mechanism of the WTO.  Under this system, 
when disputes are raised under WTO law by a government 
 
 52. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
Paris Act of July 24, 1971, as amended on Sept. 28, 1979, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ip/index.html [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
 53. WTO Agreement, supra note 29, at art. 9.1. 
 54. The Berne Convention provides copyright protection for “literary and 
artistic works,” which include “every production in the literary, scientific and 
artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression, such 
as . . . works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving and 
lithography”.  Berne Convention, supra note 52, at art. 2.1. 
 55. Berne Convention Article 6bis reads in part: 
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the 
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim 
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or 
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the 
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation. 
Berne Convention, supra note 52, at Article 6bis.1. 
 56. Upon reading a working draft of this article, one scholar noted: 
While it’s true that [indigenous authors] sometimes have difficulty 
protecting their works under established intellectual property 
doctrines, this relates to broader issues than moral rights.  In 
particular, differing conceptions of ownership and differing 
understanding[s of] the desirability of claiming exclusive rights often 
underlie the inadequacy of protection.  Thus, even if TRIPS were 
amended to protect moral rights, many indigenous authors would still 
face these same difficulties. 
Comments of Professor Laurence R. Helfer, Loyola Law School (Los Angeles, 
CA) (Jan. 2003) (copy on file with author).  For a further discussion of 
problems involving intellectual property protection of indigenous rights, see 
generally infra part II.B. 
 57. See WTO Agreement, supra note 29, at arts. 10-14. 
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seeking examination of the legality of a national measure, the 
result is a binding decision addressing the validity of the 
national regulation.58  If the complaining nation prevails, it 
may then place retaliatory tariffs on goods from the defending 
country.59 
3.  Dealing with Differences and Overlaps Between Human 
Rights Law and TRIPS 
As compared with the robust sanctions-based enforcement 
mechanism of TRIPS within the WTO, human rights treaties 
have modest implementation procedures.  Both the Human 
Rights Covenants require that States Parties report 
periodically on their progress in achieving the rights in the 
respective treaties.60  These reports are reviewed by 18-member 
treaty bodies elected by the States Parties.61  The treaty bodies 
conclude their reviews of state reports by issuing concluding 
comments in which issues are raised and recommendations are 
made.62  When the government needs to make a further report, 
usually after a couple of years, these concerns should be the 
subject of attention.  The Human Rights Committee also has 
the capacity to adjudicate complaints from the individual 
residents of the 104 nations that have ratified the Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.63  However, Committee decisions are not considered to 
be binding.64  Indeed, human rights norms are principally 
 
 58. See THE WTO SECRETARIAT, GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND 
AGREEMENTS 18-27 (1999) (discussing dispute settlement through the WTO). 
 59. See id. at 23-24 (“For a government found at fault in a dispute, the 
possibility of [tariffs as the] ultimate sanction of retaliation is undoubtedly a 
strong inducement to settle the matter by withdrawing the offending measure 
or by giving compensation.”); see also G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and 
International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 
44 DUKE L.J. 829, 832 (1995) (discussing the WTO dispute resolution system).  
While it can be argued that sovereign states can still ignore a WTO ruling, the 
cost associated with retaliatory tariffs, and the threat that such a decision 
poses to the viability of the entire WTO system and the world export economy 
militate against such a response.  See THE WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 58, 
at 24 (discussing retaliation measures). 
 60. See ICESCR, supra note 4, at art. 16 & 17; see also Civil and Political 
Covenant, supra note 15, at art. 40. 
 61. See, e.g., Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 15, at art. 28. 
 62. See id. at art. 40. 
 63. See G.A. Res. 2200A, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 59, art. 
1, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter 
Optional Protocol]. 
 64. See id. at art. 5(4) (considering Committee decisions as “views” 
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implemented at the international level by persuasion and 
embarrassment rather than sanctions.65  Hence, there is an 
imbalance in the way international obligations are effectuated 
under TRIPS and human rights treaties. 
A related problem posed by the creation of the WTO with 
its incorporation of TRIPS is its failure to address any conflicts 
that arise under international law when a country has ratified 
treaties that may differ with its obligations under the WTO.  A 
nation cannot generally absolve itself of its obligations under 
one treaty by ratifying a second treaty later.66  In a situation in 
which there is a potential conflict, the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties calls for the interpretation of the two 
treaties so as to give effect to both.67  It might be argued that 
WTO law, including TRIPS, qualifies as lex specialis.  However, 
that argument would not exempt nations from their human 
rights obligations and would not prevent human rights treaty 
bodies from assessing the human rights implications of 
intellectual property measures.68  Hence, despite the stronger 
 
without requiring action by the State Party). 
 65. See DAVID WEISSBRODT & TERESA O’TOOLE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 17, 25 (Human Rights, the United 
Nations and Amnesty International 1988); see also DAVID WEISSBRODT, ET. 
AL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 10-11 (3rd 
ed. 2001) (discussing the rare availability of sanctions). 
 66. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
(Jan. 24, 1980) at art. 30(4) (discussing the obligations of countries that are 
not all parties to an earlier treaty) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].  In the 
unlikely situation in which all the parties to both treaties are the same, 
however, and the two treaties relate to the same subject matter, the first 
treaty may be considered amended by the second treaty. Id.  Under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, “when all the parties to [an] earlier treaty 
are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or 
suspended in operation . . . the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its 
provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty.”  Id. at art. 30(3).  
Hence, the later treaty is controlling where there is a conflict, and so is treated 
as an amendment to the earlier treaty.  See id. 
 67. “When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be 
considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of 
that other treaty prevail.”  Vienna Convention, supra note 66, at art. 30(2).  To 
the extent that the treaties are compatible, then, each is given effect.  At least 
one WTO Panel Report acknowledges that States Parties must seek 
interpretations that avoid violating both treaties.  See Indonesia – Certain 
Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, Report of the Panel on Indonesia, 
WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DR59/R, WT/DS64/R (July 2, 1998) (stating that 
“under public international law there is a presumption against conflicts”). 
 68. Although the WTO is a specialized agency established under Article 
57 of the U.N. Charter, that provision does not give the WTO superior legal 
powers.  The U.N. Charter protects human rights in Articles 1, 55, and 56.  
See U.N. CHARTER art. 1 (citing human rights as a purpose of the U.N.); U.N. 
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implementation procedures of the WTO, governments are 
obligated to seek interpretations of both TRIPS and the human 
rights treaties that would avoid violating either treaty regime. 
The WTO has given short shrift to human rights norms 
when deciding conflicts in the dispute resolution system.  The 
WTO Dispute Settlement Panels and Appellate Body are 
primarily focused on scrutinizing the legality of national 
measures under GATT/WTO law.69  They are not required to 
balance various sectors of national or international law with 
trade law.70  Further, the WTO dispute resolution system has 
 
CHARTER art. 55 (calling for observance of human rights without regard to 
race, sex, language, or religion); U.N. CHARTER art. 56 (calling for joint and 
separate action under Article 55).  Further, under Article 103, the U.N. 
Charter should be considered controlling.  See U.N. CHARTER art. 103 
(indicating that in case of conflict between obligations under the Charter and 
another international agreement, those under the U.N. Charter should 
prevail).  The authority for establishment of specialized agencies under Article 
57 of the Charter does not diminish the impact of Articles 1, 55, 56, and 103.  
See U.N. CHARTER art. 57 (establishing agencies subject to acceptance by the 
General Assembly as discussed in Article 63). 
 69. The Dispute Settlement Panels handle disputes under “covered 
agreements”, which include only GATT/WTO law: the agreement establishing 
the WTO, multilateral trade agreements, and plurilateral trade agreements.  
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, App. 1., 33 I.L.M. 1244 (1994) [hereinafter Understanding].  The 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body cannot “add to or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided” in the covered WTO agreements and human rights 
instruments are not among the WTO agreements.  Id. at art. 3(2). 
 70. Id. at art. 1 (stating that the agreement covers the documents listed in 
Appendix I, but not mentioning any balancing of national concerns).  One 
could argue that some aspects of human rights law, such as the prohibition of 
genocide and slavery, constitute jus cogens and would thus prevail over 
contrary provision of WTO law.  But there is very little agreement as to which 
principles qualify as jus cogens, so that argument would probably not broaden 
the jurisdiction of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body or the qualifications of 
its members. 
One scholar has noted, however: 
[T]here is some indication from the Shrimp/Turtle case, Report of the 
Appellate Body, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) that WTO 
jurists are willing to consider not only non-trade treaties but also non-
trade soft law when interpreting WTO agreements.  In 
Shrimp/Turtle, the Appellate Body concluded that the phrase 
“exhaustible natural resources” was an “evolutionary” concept to “be 
read by a treaty interpreter in the light of contemporary concerns of 
the community of nations about the protection and conservation of the 
environment.  Those concerns, in turn, were reflected not only in 
treaties regulating natural resources but also in nonbinding 
“declarations” addressing that topic. A similar approach might be 
applied to “evolutionary” terms in TRIPS (especially the open-ended 
phrases in Articles 7 and 8), giving them a meaning that takes into 
account human rights norms endorsed by the international 
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been criticized for its lack of transparency and openness to 
input from amici curiae and other procedures for 
knowledgeable input from outside the trade field.71  Therefore, 
the imbalance in the way international obligations are realized 
under TRIPS and the human rights treaties was a significant 
motivating factor in the Sub-Commission’s decision to adopt 
Resolution 2000/7. 
B. GAPS IN PROTECTING TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, INDIGENOUS 
CULTURE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Alleged violations of indigenous cultural property rights 
attained visibility during the 1990s, before the immediate 
impetus for the adoption of Resolution 2000/7 arose.  Three 
examples of indigenous cultures clashing with intellectual 
property regimes indicate why the Sub-Commission felt 
compelled to advocate human rights protection of traditional 
knowledge as part of its resolution. 
The first two examples illustrate the insufficiency of 
copyright schemes to protect Aboriginal Australian cultural 
interests adequately.  In the first case, an Aboriginal artist 
named Terry Yumbulul created an artifact called a Dreaming 
Star Pole, which represents where one’s soul goes after death.72  
The artifact is sacred to the Aborigines, and Mr. Yumbulul had 
to undergo initiation rights in order to be allowed to create the 
 
community. 
Comments of Professor Helfer, supra note 56. 
Professor Helfer also noted that imbalances between TRIPS and human rights 
treaties seen in the context of enforcement and implementation procedures 
extend to substantive norms as well: “Particularly in the case of economic, 
social and cultural rights . . . [the human rights] treaties articulate norms at 
relatively high levels of generality as compared to the precise and detailed 
rules that TRIPS imposes.  Id.; c.f. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, at art. 30 
(dealing with patents).  “It is hard to see a conflict between these treaty 
provisions because Article 12 is quite general in scope.”  Comments of 
Professor Helfer, supra note 56.  Helfer goes on to note, however, that conflicts 
do emerge upon consideration of the Economic and Social Committee’s General 
Comments. Id.  For discussion of the Economic and Social Committee’s 
General Comments, see infra part IV.D. 
 71. See Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 17-18 (forthcoming 2003) (noting the effort of the Appellate 
Body to call for amici curiae briefs in the E.C.- Asbestos case, the criticism of 
that request by WTO Members, and the response of the Appellate Body in the 
US - Certain E.C. Products decision). 
 72. Symposium, Global Intellectual Property Rights: Boundaries of Access 
and Enforcement, Panel II: The Law and Policy of Protecting Folklore, 
Traditional Knowledge, and Genetic Resources, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 753, 760 (2002). 
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artifact.73  Mr. Yumbulul assigned the copyright on the artifact 
to an agent,74 who then passed reproductions of the artifact to 
the Reserve Bank of Australia, which used the image on an 
Australian bank note.75  Mr. Yumbulul brought suit76 against 
the Reserve Bank in an attempt to prevent distribution of the 
notes, which the clan considered a blasphemous use of their 
sacred image.77 
The High Court of Australia court ruled in favor of the 
Bank, on grounds that the copyright had been validly 
assigned.78  The court, however, noted that Australia’s 
copyright law might not “provide adequate recognition of 
Aboriginal community claims to regulate the reproduction and 
use of works which are essentially communal in origin”, but 
declined to provide relief because “the question of 
statutory recognition of Aboriginal communal interests in the 
reproduction of sacred objects is a matter for consideration by 
law reformers and legislators.”79 
The second Australian copyright case concerned the use of 
an Aboriginal painting as a template for a design woven into 
Vietnamese-manufactured carpets.80  The painting, displayed 
in the National Gallery of Australia, depicts a story of the 
Dreamtime.81  The use of a sacred image as a decoration on 
which to walk was considered highly offensive by the artists 
and their clan.82  The artists, on behalf of the clan,83 sued to 
 
 73. Id. at 761. 
 74. Probably for use in promoting societal knowledge of Aboriginal culture 
in educational settings.  See Michael Blakeney, Milpurrurru and Ors v. 
Indofurn Pty. and Ors-Protecting Expressions of Aboriginal Folklore Under 
Copyright Law, 2 E LAW-MURDOCH UNIV. ELECTRONIC J. OF LAW 1 (1995), 
available at http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v2n1/blakeney21.html. 
 75. See id. 
 76. Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia, (1991) 21 I.P.R. 481 (Austrl.). 
 77. See Blakeney, supra note 74, at 2 (referencing criticism of Yumbulul 
by the Aboriginal community for the offensive use). 
 78. Yumbulul, 21 I.P.R. at ¶ 23. 
 79. Blakeney, supra note 74, at 2 (citing Yumbulul and discussing the 
inadequacy of copyright law in protecting expressions of Aboriginal folklore). 
 80. Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty. Ltd., (1994) 54 F.C.R. 240 (Austl.). 
 81. The Dreamtime is the Aboriginal collection of folklore concerning the 
creation of the world; and virtually all Aboriginal artwork depicting stories of 
the Dreamtime are semi-sacred.  Symposium, Global Intellectual Property 
Rights, supra note 72. 
 82. Milpurrurru, 54 F.C.R. at ¶ 18. 
 83. Aboriginal custom holds that the Dreamtime stories are passed down 
through tribal custodians.  The right to create depictions of the Dreamtime is 
similarly passed down from artist to artist.  These custodians act as the 
keepers of the clan’s knowledge on behalf of their people.  Blakeney, supra 
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enjoin the use of the image, alleging cultural harm suffered by 
the clan as a whole.84  The High Court of Australia tried to 
compensate the Aborigines for the cultural harm they suffered, 
awarding damages to each of the living artists for “flagrant”85 
copyright infringement.86  Nonetheless, the court refused to 
award damages to the clan as a whole because Australian 
copyright law did not provide a remedy for the alleged 
infringement of a collective ownership right.87 
The Yumbulul and Milpurrurru cases highlight gaps in the 
protection of indigenous rights under existing copyright law 
regimes.  Both cases turn in part on the problem of establishing 
authorship.88  Many indigenous peoples claim a collective right 
of ownership, or alternatively assert that styles of art have 
been passed down from generation to generation.89  Such 
assertions raise issues of standing to bring suit, and duration of 
protection to be conferred.90  Furthermore, even in cases like 
 
note 74, at 5. 
 84. Milpurrurru, 54 F.C.R. at ¶ 12. 
 85. Australian law allows for increased compensatory damages for 
copyright infringement in cases where the infringement was executed with 
“total disregard not only for the legal rights of the plaintiff regarding copyright 
but for his feelings and his sense of family dignity and pride.”  Williams v. 
Settle, 1 W.L.R. 1072, 1082 (1960) (Eng. C.A.).  In the Milpurrurru case, it was 
established that the Aboriginal depictions had been designated for educational 
display only, and that the artists had indicated that use of the images on 
carpets would be highly offensive to themselves and their clan.  Milpurrurru, 
54 F.C.R.  at ¶¶ 13–16. 
 86. Each artist was awarded Australian $15,000 to “reflect the harm 
suffered . . . in their cultural environment.”  Blakeney, supra note 74, at 4. 
 87. The Milpurrurru court stated that “[t]he statutory remedies do not 
recognise the infringement of ownership rights of the kind which reside under 
Aboriginal law in the traditional owners of the dreaming stories and the 
imagery such as that used in the artworks of the present applicants.”  
Milpurrurru, 54 F.C.R. at ¶ 127.  See Blakeney, supra note 74, at 5 (noting 
that Australian copyright law provides remedies for infringement in 
proportion to the economic damage caused by the infringement, and further 
noting that it was untenable to think that the court could quantify the extent 
of economic damage to the Aboriginal cultural right). 
 88. Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia, (1991) 21 I.P.R. 481, ¶ 21 
(Austrl.); Blakeney, supra note 74, at 2. 
 89. Yumbulul, 21 I.P.R. at ¶ 21. 
 90. Many copyright regimes require a specific, identifiable author, or at 
least some identifiable entity that created the subject matter, in order to 
confer copyright protection.  Blakeney, supra note 74, at 5.  Since an entire 
indigenous clan or regional population generally does not participate in the 
creation of a particular artifact, there is a question of who exactly has suffered 
a legal harm for which they can pursue a legal remedy.  Furthermore, in cases 
where indigenous peoples claim that the original depictions were created by 
ancestors thousands of years ago, most copyright systems provide scant 
protection, since the original author’s life and limited term of protection has 
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Milpurrurru where courts do provide a remedy, it usually takes 
the form of monetary compensation.91  In many cases, 
pecuniary gain could never fully compensate for the cultural 
harm suffered in these situations, and does little to deter future 
offenses.92 
The cultural harms suffered in the Milpurrurru and 
Yumbulul cases implicate rights guaranteed under the 
ICESCR.  Article 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR recognizes the right of 
everyone “to take part in cultural life”, and Article 15(1)(c) 
recognizes the right of everyone “[t]o benefit from the 
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from 
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the 
author.”93 
The third traditional knowledge case, which received 
greater publicity, related to the validity of a patent on an 
extract from the oil of an Asian tree.94  The neem tree is 
indigenous to the Indian subcontinent.95  Neem bark has been 
used for centuries as a traditional medicine, insecticide and 
fungicide.96  The pharmaceutical manufacturer W.R. Grace Co. 
initially obtained a patent97 from the European Patent Office 
(EPO) on the fungicidal properties of a neem oil extract, and 
then cheekily tried to sell the patented product on the Indian 
market.98  Upon appeal by the Green Party of the European 
Parliament and an Indian nongovernmental organization 
(NGO), the EPO revoked the patent on grounds that it did not 
qualify as a novel invention in light of the traditional use of 
neem bark in Indian society.99  The EPO’s revocation of a 
patent on neem tree oil extract was a rare victory for 
traditional scientific knowledge over modern patent schemes.100 
 
long since expired.  Id. 
 91. Milpurrurru, 54 F.C.R. at ¶ 166. 
 92. Blakeney, supra note 74, at 4. 
 93. ICESCR, supra note 4, at art. 15. 
 94. Karen Hoggan, Neem tree patent revoked, BBC NEWS ONLINE, May 11, 
2000, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/745028.stm. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. European Patent No. EP0436257 (issued July 10, 1991). 
 98. Symposium, Global Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 72, at 765. 
 99. Hoggan, supra note 94. 
 100. Besides increasing public awareness of the grave risks that 
corporations would unjustly exploit indigenous and traditional knowledge, the 
neem tree case raised three additional points of interest.  First, the U.S. Dept. 
of Agriculture was a co-applicant with W.R. Grace for the neem oil patent.  See 
Hoggan, supra note 94.  Hence, the U.S. government contributed to and 
encouraged exploitation of traditional knowledge under current intellectual 
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Responding to concerns arising from cases like the neem 
tree, Milpurrurru, and Yumbulul, Sub-Commission member 
Dr. Erica-Irene A. Daes has advocated the protection of 
indigenous cultural and property rights.101  As Chairperson and 
Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission’s Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations, Dr. Daes was the principal author of 
the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.102  
This Draft Declaration103 called for the broad recognition and 
respect for indigenous peoples’ rights, including cultural and 
intellectual property rights.104  Dr. Daes continued to campaign 
 
property regimes.  Second, the plaintiffs in the revocation action argued that, 
in addition to non-novelty, Grace’s patent should be revoked as “against public 
morality.”  Decision Revoking European Patent No. EP0436257, European 
Patent Office (Feb. 13, 2001) (available from European Patent Office; on file 
with editor) (European Patent Convention (Jan. 2000) Art. 53 reads in part: 
“[P]atents shall not be granted in respect of inventions the publication or 
exploitation of which would be contrary to [the public order] or morality”).  
Although the EPO declined to rule on that question, the fact that the 
argument was brought at all signals a move towards using human rights 
arguments as a means of combating unfair intellectual property 
determinations.  Similar arguments could be advanced in future patent 
disputes in the context of TRIPS, which contains a “public morality” article 
similar to the one in the European Patent Convention. See WTO Agreement, 
supra note 29, at art. 27.2. “Members may exclude from patentability 
inventions, the prevention of which within their territory . . . is necessary to 
protect ordre public or morality.” Id.  Third, the EPO revoked the neem tree oil 
patent in part because the European Parliament’s Green Party advocated the 
patent appeal.  In the absence of influential and knowledgeable allies like the 
Greens, indigenous peoples may lack the resources to raise successful 
objections to the appropriation of their traditional knowledge by wealthy 
corporations. 
 101. Erica-Irene A. Daes, Equality of Indigenous Peoples Under the 
Auspices of the United Nations-Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 493 (1995). 
 102. Id. at 494. 
 103. Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: Report of the Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations on its eleventh session, U.N. ESCOR, 
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 45th Sess., Agenda item 14, 
annex I, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29 (1993) [hereinafter Draft 
Declaration].  The U.N. Commission on Human Rights has referred the draft 
Declaration to its Working Group on the Draft United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, where it has been under consideration since 
1989.  Daes, supra note 102, at 494. 
 104. Article 29 reads: 
Indigenous peoples are entitled to the recognition of the full 
ownership, control and protection of their cultural and intellectual 
property. 
They have the right to special measures to control, develop and 
protect their sciences, technologies and cultural manifestations, 
including human and other genetic resources, seeds, medicines, 
knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions, 
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for indigenous peoples’ interests,105 emphasizing that U.N. 
Member nations must not only recognize the existence of 
indigenous peoples’ rights, but also enact national legislation 
providing stringent substantive and jurisdictional protection of 
those rights.106 
Dr. Daes’ Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the 
Heritage of Indigenous Peoples indicates how indigenous rights 
can be more effectively protected.107  Collective ownership and 
custodial ownership created through initiation procedures 
should be recognized and incorporated into national legal 
systems.108  Patent and copyright protection for indigenous 
knowledge should be available only after the traditional 
owners’ free and informed consent has been secured.109  States 
should create prompt and effective judicial measures to allow 
traditional owners to “prevent, punish and obtain full 
restitution and just compensation” for unlawful acquisition or 
use of their cultural heritage.110  In addition, “[b]usiness and 
industry should ensure they have . . . free and informed consent 
of indigenous peoples when entering into agreements for the 
rights to . . . use previously undescribed [sic] species or 
cultivated varieties of plants, animals or micro-organisms, or 
naturally occurring pharmaceuticals.”111  Moreover, “[a]ny 
 
literatures, designs and visual and performing arts. 
Draft Declaration, supra note 103, at art. 29. 
 105. After preparing the 1993 Draft Declaration, supra note 103, Dr. Daes 
wrote Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of 
Indigenous Peoples in 1995.  Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: 
Protection of the heritage of indigenous people, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on 
Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, 47th Sess., Provisional Agenda item 15, at annex I, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26 (1995) [hereinafter Principles and 
Guidelines].  She also chaired a revision of those Principles and Guidelines in 
2000. See Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Report of the Seminar on the 
draft principles and guidelines for the protection of the heritage of indigenous 
people, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 52nd Sess., 
Provisional Agenda item 7, at annex I, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/26 (2000) 
[hereinafter Seminar on Principles and Guidelines]. 
 106. Erica-Irene Daes, Intellectual Property and Indigenous Peoples, 95 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 143, 150 (2001) (calling for “strengthening [of] 
transboundary jurisdictions of national courts to enforce private international 
law and . . . ensuring international respect for the customary intellectual 
property laws of indigenous peoples as a matter of choice of law”). 
 107. See Seminar on Principles and Guidelines, supra note 105, at annex 1. 
 108. Id. at ¶¶ 14-15 & 24. 
 109. Id. at ¶¶ 23(a), 23(c). 
 110. Id. at ¶ 23(b). 
 111. Id. at ¶ 36 
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agreement should ensure that the indigenous peoples 
concerned continue to be primary beneficiaries of commercial 
application.”112  Further, “[i]ndigenous peoples and their 
representative organizations should . . . participate in[] all 
intergovernmental discussions and negotiations in the field of 
intellectual property rights, to share their views on the 
measures needed to protect their heritage through 
international law.”113  These guidelines address many of the 
inadequacies of intellectual property protection for traditional 
heritage highlighted in Yumbulul,114 Milpurrurru,115 and neem 
tree cases.116  Ultimately, since legal regimes often provided 
inadequate protection for indigenous peoples’ knowledge, 
culture, and human rights, the Sub-Commission explicitly to 
refer to these concerns as a motivating factor for the adoption 
of Resolution 2000/7.117 
C.  THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON THE 
REALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
The Sub-Commission indicated that the negative effect of 
globalization on human rights was another motivating factor 
for the adoption of Resolution 2000/7.118  Specifically, the Sub-
Commission relied on reports from two Special Rapporteurs, as 
well as from its working group on transnational corporations, 
to support a request for “[g]overnments and national, regional 
 
 112. Id. at ¶ 36.  By explicitly referencing indigenous rights to plants, 
animals, and micro-organisms, the Seminar on Principles and Guidelines echo 
a major theme espoused within the Convention on Biological Diversity of 1992.  
Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 16 U.N.T.S. 229, U.N. Doc. 
UNEP/BIO.Div/N7 – INC.5/4 (1992).  A product of the 1992 Earth Summit, 
the Convention on Biological Diversity seeks to encourage sustainable use of 
the components of biodiversity, and to share the benefits of such use in a fair 
and equitable way.  The neem tree case and the debate over the use of 
terminator technology in agriculture, see supra section II.B and infra section 
II.C, are examples of biodiversity exploitation addressed by the Convention on 
Biological Diversity.  Resolution 2000/7 indicated that the Convention on 
Biological Diversity was a motivating factor in the Sub-Commission’s decision 
to adopt Resolution 2000/7.  See Resolution 2000/7, supra note 1.  Further 
information about the Convention on Biological Diversity, as well as the text 
of the Convention, see 
http://www.fao.org/WAICENT/FaoInfo/Agricult/AGP/AGPS/pgrfa/pdf/cbde.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 2, 2003). 
 113. Seminar on Principles and Guidelines, supra note 105, at ¶ 51. 
 114. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 115. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 116. See supra note 94-100 and accompanying text. 
 117. Resolution 2000/7, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 1-16. 
 118. Id. 
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and international economic policy forums to take international 
human rights obligations and principles fully into account in 
international economic policy formulation”.119  Because the 
Sub-Commission explicitly referenced these globalization 
reports as supporting their decision to adopt Resolution 2000/7, 
it is appropriate to examine those reports briefly. 
1.  The Special Rapporteurs’ Preliminary Report 
J. Oloka-Onyango and Deepika Udagama, Sub-
Commission Special Rapporteurs on globalization and its 
impact on the full enjoyment of human rights, submitted a 
preliminary report to the Sub-Commission two months before 
the adoption of Resolution 2000/7.120  The Special Rapporteurs’ 
report began by reminding the Sub-Commission that 
globalization is not a purely economic phenomenon that is 
divorced from human values and policy decisions.121  Instead, 
the report contended that “[t]he boundaries within which the 
market operates are defined politically, in direct negotiations 
between governments in multilateral forums, such as the 
World Trade Organization.”122  By asserting that political 
decisions shape the path of globalization, the Special 
Rapporteurs indicated that some human rights problems can be 
ameliorated at their source, by modifying the political decisions 
that enable globalization.123 
The report critiqued the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
for contributing to increasing global inequality and 
discrimination.124  It also characterized the WTO structure and 
its assumptions about global trade as being heavily biased in 
favor of transnational corporations and developed nations.125 
 
 119. Id. at ¶ 4. 
 120. J. Oloka-Onyango & Deepika Udagama, The Realization of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment 
of human rights, ESCOR, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights, 52d Sess., Provisional Agenda item 4, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13 (2000) [hereinafter Special Rapporteurs’ Report]. 
 121. Special Rapporteurs’ Report, supra note 120, at ¶¶ 1-5. 
 122. Id. at ¶ 7 (citing Fernando Enrique Cardoso, Globalization and 
International Relations, Public Address to the South African Institute of 
International Affairs in Johannesburg (Nov. 26, 1996) at 5-6). 
 123. See Special Rapporteurs’ Report, supra note 120, at ¶¶ 7-10. 
 124. See id. at ¶¶ 13-19. 
 125. “Indeed, the assumptions on which the rules of WTO are based are 
grossly unfair and even prejudiced. Those rules also reflect an agenda that 
serves only to promote dominant corporatist interests that already monopolize 
the arena of international trade.”  Special Rapporteurs’ Report, supra note 
120, at ¶ 14. 
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While the WTO can be fairly characterized as democratic in 
form (since it allows one vote per member and purports to use 
consensus decision-making),126 in practice the WTO has 
operated unfairly to less-developed nations, which are often 
denied participation in policy-making decisions.127  Therefore, 
the report called for the WTO’s deliberative and policy-setting 
procedures to be made more transparent, and more receptive to 
developing nations. 
The Special Rapporteurs’ report also disapproved of the 
WTO’s intellectual property protection system,128 positing that 
the TRIPS’ guarantee of the patentability of plant varieties and 
life forms was a legal and economic usurpation.129  
Furthermore, the Special Rapporteurs recommended that if the 
WTO truly desired a commitment to a balanced trade 
liberalization scheme, it would embrace a dialogue of inclusion 
for developing nation concerns.130 
2.  The Working Group on the Working Methods and Activities 
of Transnational Corporations 
One further precursor of Sub-Commission Resolution 
2000/7 arose in the context of the Sub-Commission’s study and 
drafting of obligations that transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises owe to human rights.131  In its 
 
 126. Id. at ¶ 16. 
 127.  
[W]hether one considers the dispute settlement procedures, the 
mechanisms for implementing agreements or the areas selected for 
negotiations, one comes to realize that the WTO structure is heavily 
tilted in favour of developed countries, such that developing countries 
are, de facto, kept away from decision-making mechanisms and from 
policy-making; similarly, their own specific problems are not 
sufficiently taken into account. 
Special Rapporteurs’ Report, supra note 120, at ¶ 16 (citing Anne-Christine 
Habbard and Marie Guirand, The World Trade Organization and Human 
Rights, International Federation of Human Rights, Position Paper (November 
1999)). 
 128. See supra section II.A(2). 
 129. Special Rapporteurs Report, supra note 121, at ¶ 18. 
 130. “[The WTO] must not only include intellectual property protections of 
interest to the developed countries, but also address issues of current or 
potential concern for developing countries, such as property rights for 
knowledge embedded in traditional medicines, or the pricing of 
pharmaceuticals in developing country markets.” Special Rapporteurs’ Report, 
supra note 120, at ¶ 19 (citing Joseph F. Stiglitz, Trade and the Developing 
World: A New Agenda, CURRENT HISTORY 387 (November 1999)). 
 131. E.S.C. Res. 1998/8, The relationship between the enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights and the right to development, and the 
working methods and qctivities of transnational corporations, ESCOR, 
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resolution 1998/8 of 20 August 1998 the Sub-Commission 
decided “to establish, for a three-year period, a sessional 
working group of the Sub-Commission, composed of five of its 
members, taking into account the principle of equitable 
geographical distribution, to examine the working methods and 
activities of transnational corporations.”132  The first meeting of 
the Working Group in 1999 requested preparation of a draft 
code of conduct for transnational corporations.133  While the 
first draft code of conduct did not contain a provision on 
intellectual property and human rights, a more recent 
document134 produced by members of the Working Group tracks 
Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement.135 
The development of genetically modified “terminator” seeds 
in the late 1990s was a clear example of questionable corporate 
behavior that motivated the adoption of Sub-Commission 
Resolution 2000/7.  Terminator technology enables seed 
suppliers to create strains of crop seeds that are incapable of 
reproducing.136  Agribusiness companies “stood to make huge 
profits from the technique since it meant that farmers could not 
continue holding over seeds produced in one growing season for 
use in the next - a widespread practice in most developing 
countries.”137  Although many other agricultural companies 
were also developing genetically modified seeds, the Monsanto 
Corporation became the target of widespread public concern 
over the anticipated sales of sterile seeds in the markets of 
developing nations.138  The international furor eventually led 
 
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1999/4, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/45 (1998). 
 132. Id. at ¶ 4. 
 133. See The Realization of Economic Social and Cultural Rights: Report of 
the sessional working group on the working methods and activities of 
transnational corporations on its first session, ESCOR, Commission on Human 
Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 
51st Sess., at ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/9 (1999). 
 134. Human Rights Principles and Responsibilities for Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: With Commentary on the 
Principles, ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, at ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/WG.2/WP.1/Add.2 (2002). 
 135. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, at art. 7 (specifying the objectives of 
protecting intellectual property). 
 136. Danielle Knight, Cheers for Monsanto’s Reversal on “Terminator”, 
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 5, 1999, available at 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/cheers-cn.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2003). 
 137. Id. 
 138. In fact, at the time Monsanto promised not to market sterile seed 
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Monsanto to pledge that it would not commercialize the 
terminator technology that creates sterile seeds.139  Although 
Monsanto’s declaration heralded a significant victory for 
developing countries, critics of terminator technology were 
quick to note that the dangers of genetic manipulation of seeds 
had by no means vanished.140  At the time of its announcement 
not to market sterile seeds, Monsanto was believed to have 87 
other terminator patents pending in developing countries,141 
including one for a genetic modification that would “make a 
seed not germinate unless exposed to a certain chemical.”142  
Other major agribusinesses were pursuing similar patents for 
technology that could be used to control various “developmental 
processes in plants - including germination, sprouting, 
flowering and fruit ripening.”143  The potentially devastating 
effect that such technology could have on developing nations’ 
agricultural sectors typified the concerns that motivated the 
Sub-Commission to create the Working Group on the methods 
and practices of transnational corporations, and was a 
significant factor in the Sub-Commission’s decision to adopt 
Resolution 2000/7.144 
 
III. THE GENESIS AND ADOPTION OF SUB-COMMISSION 
RESOLUTION 2000/7   
 
As the preceding section of this article shows, human 
rights concerns had been expressed with regard to intellectual 
property protection and global trade before the Sub-
Commission adopted Resolution 2000/7.  The Sub-Commission, 
 
technology, it did not yet possess the rights to that specific technique.  The 
technology was jointly developed by the USDA and Delta and Pine Land 
Company, a smaller business that Monsanto was attempting to take over.  See 
Terminator gene halt a ‘major U-Turn’, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Oct. 5, 1999, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/465222.stm (last visited Jan. 31, 
2003); see also Knight, supra note 136. 
 139. Knight, supra note 136. 
 140. Id. 
 141. John Vidal, World braced for terminator 2, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 6, 
1999. 
 142. Knight, supra note 136. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of human 
rights: Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights submitted in 
accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/32, ESCOR, 
Commission on Human Rights, 58th Sess., Provisional Agenda item 10, at ¶¶ 
21, 34, 43, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/54 (2002). 
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however, had a more immediate catalyst for Resolution 2000/7 
and its call for a human rights approach to devising 
international intellectual property protection and global trade 
regimes.  
In late July 2000, a Lutheran World Fund 
representative145 named Peter Prove submitted to the Sub-
Commission a joint statement by three NGOs.146  This 
statement urged the Sub-Commission to “take concrete action 
on TRIPS . . . [by] reassert[ing] the primacy of human rights 
obligations over the commercial and profit-driven motives upon 
which agreements such as TRIPS are based.”147  The statement 
specifically called attention to human rights implications of 
economic globalization, TRIPS’ acceptance of biopiracy, and 
TRIPS’ stringent protection of TNC interests with respect to 
technology transfers.148 
Issues of globalization, indigenous rights protection, and 
TNC behavior had been separately mentioned for years before 
Prove submitted the joint statement.149  Nonetheless, the Sub-
Commission had not taken any action in regard to TRIPS and 
international intellectual property protection.150  Prove found 
an ally in Asbjørn Eide, a Norwegian member of the Sub-
Commission.151  Eide proposed a resolution criticizing existing 
international intellectual property regimes.152  Because no one 
anticipated the proposal, there was little opposition to Eide’s 
 
 145. The Lutheran World Federation (LWF) is an international 
organization of Lutheran churches that provides humanitarian assistance in 
troubled areas of the world, and advocates for greater awareness of human 
rights.  See generally http://www.lutheranworld.org.  Peter Prove is an LWF 
representative and is a well-respected NGO advocate at the Sub-Commission. 
 146. The statement was submitted to the Sub-Commission by Habitat 
International Coalition, the International NGO Committee on Human Rights 
in Trade and Investment [hereinafter INCHRTI], and the Lutheran World 
Federation.  The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Joint 
written statement submitted by Habitat International Coalition and the 
Lutheran World Federation, non-governmental organizations in special 
conservative status, ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission 
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 52nd Sess. Provisional 
Agenda item 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/NGO/14 (2000) [hereinafter 
Joint HIC/LWF Stmt.]. 
 147. See Joint HIC/LWF Stmt., supra note 146, at 6. 
 148. See id. at 4-6. 
 149. Prof. Weissbrodt is a member of the Sub-Commission and was present 
at these events. 
 150. See Joint HIC/LWF Stmt., supra note 146, at 4-6. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
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resolution expressing human rights concerns about TRIPS.153  
This lack of opposition, combined with the Sub-Commission’s 
awareness of the related problems presented by globalization 
and indigenous rights, helped Eide to push international 
intellectual property protection onto the Sub-Commission’s 
agenda.154 
Although the Sub-Commission softened its tone somewhat 
in comparison to the forceful language of the NGO statement, 
the actions urged by Resolution 2000/7 were nonetheless a 
significant set of propositions.  Referencing Daes’ work on 
indigenous cultural rights, problems highlighted in the 
globalization report,155 and “actual or potential conflicts . . . 
between the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the 
realization of economic, social and cultural rights”,156 the 
resolution made the following requests: (1) that governments 
give primary consideration to human rights objectives when 
crafting national policy and legislation pertaining to 
intellectual property; (2) that intergovernmental organizations 
provide similar integration of human rights principles into 
their policies and practices; (3) that the WTO in particular take 
human rights obligations into account when reviewing the 
TRIPS Agreement; and (4) that various U.N. bodies (including 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (HCHR), the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the 
Secretary-General) take further measures to analyze the 
human rights impacts of the TRIPS Agreement.157 
IV. REACTIONS TO RESOLUTION 2000/7 
If the relationships between international intellectual 
property protection, globalization, and human rights had not 
been particularly visible before the summer of 2000, they 
certainly were subjected to more detailed scrutiny after the 
Sub-Commission adopted Resolution 2000/7.  The Sub-
Commission’s resolution generated responses from U.N. bodies, 
intergovernmental organizations, and governments. 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 156. See Resolution 2000/7, supra note 1, at preface; see also supra Part 
II.A(2). 
 157. See Resolution 2000/7, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 3-15. 
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A. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER’S REPORT ON TRIPS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
Pursuant to the Sub-Commission’s request, the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (HCHR) submitted a report 
on the impact of TRIPS on human rights.  The HCHR’s report 
undertook a two-step analysis.  First, the report assessed the 
degree to which TRIPS was compatible with a human rights 
approach to intellectual property protection.158  Second, to the 
extent that TRIPS did not comport with human rights 
standards, the report made recommendations for implementing 
flexibility within the TRIPS Agreement that would foster a 
more human rights-oriented approach to international 
intellectual property protection.159 
The HCHR determined that as currently implemented, 
TRIPS was not fully compatible with human rights objectives.  
First, the HCHR noted that “the overall thrust of the TRIPS 
Agreement is the promotion of innovation through the 
provision of commercial incentives.  The various links with the 
subject matter of human rights . . . are generally expressed in 
terms of exceptions to the rule rather than the guiding 
principles themselves”.160  Second, TRIPS explicitly details 
intellectual property rights, but refers only to general 
responsibilities of intellectual property holders.161  The HCHR 
indicated that, for States parties to both TRIPS and ICESCR, 
the balance of interests identified in TRIPS Article 7162 might 
not be sufficient to meet its human rights obligations under 
ICESCR.163 Third, the HCHR noted that the TRIPS-imposed 
 
 158. The impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights on human rights: Report of the High Commissioner, ESCOR, 
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, 52nd Sess., Provisional Agenda item 4, ¶ 15, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (2001) [hereinafter High Commissioner’s 
TRIPS Report]. 
 159. See id. at ¶¶ 60-69. 
 160. Id. at ¶ 22. 
 161. Id. at ¶ 23. 
 162. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 163. ICESCR Article 15 delineates a need to balance protection of the 
interests of intellectual property holders and the public.  In this respect, 
ICESCR is similar to TRIPS Art. 7.  However, the HCHR noted that ICESCR 
Art. 15 must be read in conjunction with ICESCR Art. 5, which holds that 
nothing in ICESCR can justify any act aimed at the destruction of any of its 
rights or freedoms or to limit a right beyond what is provided for in ICESCR.  
High Commissioner’s TRIPS Report, see supra note 158, at ¶ 13.  Hence, 
ICESCR may well require greater obligations to realize human rights than 
does TRIPS Art. 7. 
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obligation “to provide protection for all forms of technology has 
an impact on States’ ability to decide on development 
strategies.”164  These limitations originate from similar policies 
in industrialized countries and do not necessarily coincide with 
objectives of developing nations.165  In addition, some 
developing nations lack the requisite infrastructure to 
implement the developed nation policies mandated by 
TRIPS.166  Further, the HCHR noted that TRIPS contained no 
provisions for the protection of cultural heritage and 
indigenous rights.167 
In light of these shortcomings the High Commissioner 
made a series of recommendations.168  First, States should 
monitor TRIPS implementation through national legislation to 
ensure that it meets the human rights standards detailed in 
the ICESCR.169  Second, the HCHR encouraged States to 
modify their intellectual property regimes to provide protection 
for indigenous community interests.170  Third, States should 
pass legislation that ensured access to essential drugs, so as to 
protect the right to the highest available standard of health.171  
Fourth, the High Commissioner suggested that TRIPS Article 7 
be amended to include an explicit reference to human rights.172  
Finally, the High Commissioner encouraged the Sub-
Commission to continue examining the interaction of 
intellectual property rights and other human rights.173 
 
 164. High Commissioner’s TRIPS Report, supra note 158, at ¶ 24. 
 165. Id. at ¶ 25. 
 166. See id. at ¶¶ 24-5. 
 167. Id. at ¶ 26. 
 168. Id at ¶¶ 59-70. 
 169. See id. at ¶ 61. 
 170. See id. at ¶ 65. 
 171. A large portion of the High Commissioner’s Report was devoted to an 
analysis of whether TRIPS left sufficient room for States to address public 
health issues; Brazil’s approach to its national AIDS crisis was one focus of 
this discussion.  For a more detailed discussion of the Brazil case, see infra 
notes 187-194 and accompanying text. 
The High Commissioner’s Report determined that TRIPS does allow for States 
to enact legislation allowing compulsory licensing and parallel importation of 
drugs in times of public health emergency.  As a result, the High 
Commissioner recommended that States pass national legislation securing 
those privileges.  High Commissioner’s TRIPS report, supra note 158, at ¶ 66. 
 172. High Commissioner’s TRIPS Report, supra note 158, at ¶ 68. 
 173. The High Commissioner’s recommendations can be found in High 
Commissioner’s TRIPS Report, supra note 158, at ¶¶ 59-70. 
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B. THE WTO/WIPO RESPONSE 
The WTO and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) were surprised by and did not agree with 
Resolution 2000/7’s criticisms.  Both organizations stated that 
the tension between rights of intellectual property holders and 
the public interest was “complementary rather than mutually 
exclusive”,174 and that TRIPS Article 7 adequately reflected 
this complementary tension.  With respect to drug access, the 
organizations contended that Article 8’s recognition of States’ 
interest in “protecting health”,175 coupled with Article 31’s 
provisions for limited exceptions to the exclusivity of patent 
protection,176 sufficiently enabled States to address their public 
health concerns.177  The WTO acknowledged that many 
national intellectual property regimes did not provide 
comprehensive protection for traditional knowledge.178  
Nonetheless, the WTO thought that TRIPS mandated complete 
protection of traditional knowledge, and that gaps in coverage 
might be better filled by national legislation rather than by a 
retooling of TRIPS itself.179  In short, the WTO and WIPO did 
not concur with the Sub-Commission’s conclusion that TRIPS 
conflicted with human rights objections. 
C. STATE RESPONSES 
Echoing the WTO/WIPO positions, the European 
Commission also asserted that TRIPS adequately provided for 
 
 174. Intellectual property rights and human rights: Report of the Secretary-
General, ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 52nd Sess., Provisional Agenda 
item 4, § II.B.2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/12 (2001).  The Secretary-
General’s report consisted of reactions to Resolution 2000/7 from various 
nations, NGOs, and intergovernmental bodies that were submitted to the 
Secretary-General.  Section II(B) of this document contained the WTO’s 
response.  Id. at § II.B.1-13.  Responses from other organizations were 
included in a separate document.  See generally Intellectual property rights 
and human rights: Report of the Secretary-General, Addendum, ESCOR, 
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, 52nd Sess., Provisional Agenda item 4, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/12/Add.1 (2001) [hereinafter Addendum] (providing that 
the Secretary-General received additional replies, including one from WIPO). 
 175. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text. 
 177. Intellectual property rights and human rights: Report of the Secretary-
General, supra note 174, at ¶ 10; see also Addendum supra note 174, at ¶¶ 8-
12. 
 178. Intellectual property rights and human rights: Report of the Secretary-
General, supra note 174, at ¶¶ 11-13. 
 179. Id. 
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the realization of human rights.  Like the WTO and WIPO, the 
Commission thought that TRIPS Article 7 struck an 
appropriate balance of interests.180  The Commission reiterated 
that TRIPS principles should not allow patenting of traditional 
knowledge.181  The Commission noted that TRIPS does not 
speak directly to the issue, but believed that this silence 
provided States with enough leeway to enact legislation specific 
to traditional knowledge if they so desired.182  The Commission 
also encouraged the creation of traditional knowledge 
databases and the inclusion in all patent applications of the 
geographic origin of any biological material in order to reduce 
conflicts in instances like the “neem tree oil” case.183 
The European Commission did not believe that TRIPS 
needed to be altered in order to enable States to address public 
health concerns.184  The Commission thought that developing 
nations and the international community should concentrate on 
preventing disease, fostering drug distribution mechanisms, 
and building health care infrastructures, rather than 
pressuring large pharmaceutical companies to provide cheap 
medicines.185 The Commission also voiced concerns about any 
provisions that deny intellectual property protection, arguing 
that rigorous patent protection is necessary in order to provide 
pharmaceutical companies with an incentive to continue 
research and development programs.186 
Unlike the European Commission, some States believed 
that affordable medicine constituted a crucial step in promoting 
public health.  The most visible test of TRIPS’ mandates came 
from Brazil, whose 1997 decision to enact compulsory licensing 
legislation enabled generic production of internationally 
 
 180. Submission to the United Nations Secretary General from the Services 
of the European Commission with Regard to Resolution 2000/7and the 
Request for a Report on Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, at ¶ 7, 
(July 31, 2001). 
 181. Id. at ¶ 23. 
 182. Id. at ¶¶ 22-23. 
 183. Id. at ¶¶ 23-24. 
 184. Id. at ¶ 12, 31. 
 185. Id. at ¶ 12.  The Commission also indicated a concern that providing 
cheap drugs could lead to problems with parallel importation.  When a 
pharmaceutical company engages in differential pricing based on the 
purchasing power of a given market, it runs the risk of selling drugs cheaply 
to a poor nation that may turn around and re-sell the product to a nation with 
greater purchasing power.  Id. at ¶ 13.  This problem would leave the poor 
nation with no drugs and reduce the pharmaceutical company’s profits. 
 186. Id. at ¶ 14. 
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patented AIDS drugs.187  Although contentious at the time, 
Brazil’s acts have generally been considered a stunning public 
health success.  Within four years of initiating its compulsory 
licensing program, Brazil reduced its AIDS death rate by 50%, 
while simultaneously reducing per capita expenditures on 
pharmaceuticals.188  Indeed, the High Commissioner’s TRIPS 
Report, discussed above, praised the Brazilian government for 
“implementing the public health safeguards in the TRIPS 
Agreement” in a way that “has successfully married 
implementation of the Agreement with its obligations under 
human rights law”.189 
The United States contested Brazil’s compulsory licensing 
program.  In January 2001, the United States requested the 
establishment of a WTO dispute resolution panel, alleging that 
Brazil’s compulsory licensing law violated U.S. patent holders’ 
rights guaranteed by TRIPS.190  The U.S. subsequently agreed 
to drop the WTO suit, provided that Brazil consult with the 
U.S. government if Brazil intended to implement compulsory 
licensing in the future.191 
The United States’ decision to drop its complaint was 
influenced by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights’ April 23, 
2001, adoption of a resolution supporting Brazil’s compulsory 
licensing program.  Commission Resolution 2001/33 called upon 
States to “pursue policies . . . which would promote . . . [t]he 
availability in sufficient quantities of pharmaceuticals . . . used 
to treat pandemics such as HIV/AIDS”.192  To that end, the 
 
 187. Decreto No. 9.279, de 14 de Mayo de 1996, D.O. de 15.05.1996.  Article 
68 of this law authorized the government to provide for compulsory licensing 
where a patent holder exercises patent rights in an abusive manner, and in 
cases of national emergency or public interest.  These provisions mimic the 
TRIPS’ compulsory licensing provision outlined in Article 31.  High 
Commissioner’s TRIPS Report, see supra note 158, at ¶ 55. 
 188. High Commissioner’s TRIPS Report, supra note 158, at ¶ 57.  Brazil 
also saw an 80% decrease in hospitalization due to opportunistic diseases that 
so often afflict AIDS patients.  The Brazilian Ministry of Health reduced its 
drug expenditure from $336 million to $319 million between 1999 and 2000, 
yet also managed to deliver drugs to an additional 12,000 patients during that 
same 12-month span.  Local production of generic drugs has cut production 
costs by an average of 70% since the inception of the compulsory licensing 
program. 
 189. Id. at ¶ 58. 
 190. See Brazil - Measures Affecting Patent Protection: Request for the 
Establishment of a Panel by the United States, WTO Doc. WT/ DS199/3 (Jan. 
9, 2001). 
 191. Brazil - Measures Affecting Patent Protection: Notification of Mutually 
Agreed Solution, WTO Doc. WT/DS199/4 (July 19, 2001). 
 192. Commission on Human Rights Res. 2001/33, Access to medication in 
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Commission encouraged States to “adopt legislation . . . to 
safeguard access to such preventative, curative or palliative 
pharmaceuticals or medical technologies from any limitations 
by third parties”.193  Furthermore, the Commission called on 
States to “refrain from taking measures which would deny or 
limit equal access for all persons to such . . . pharmaceuticals 
and medical technologies”.194  This resolution endorsed Brazil’s 
compulsory licensing program, and discouraged aggressive 
pharmaceutical patent protection such as the U.S. complaint 
pending with the WTO at the time.195  The U.S. abstention 
constituted the only opposition to the otherwise unanimous 
adoption of Commission Resolution 2001/33. 
A scenario similar to the US-Brazil dispute took place 
when the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South 
Africa sued the South African government in South Africa’s 
Constitutional Court.196  The pharmaceutical manufacturers’ 
alleged that an amendment to South Africa’s patent laws 
infringed on the manufacturers’ property rights and conflicted 
with TRIPS-mandated patent protection.197  The 
 
the context of pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, ESCOR, Commission on Human 
Rights, 57th Sess., 71st mtg., ¶ 2(a) U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/33 (2001) 
[hereinafter Commission on Human Rights Res. 2001/33], available at 
http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord2001/documentation/commission/2001-33.htm 
(last visited Dec. 2, 2003). 
 193. Id. at ¶ 3(b). 
 194. Id. at ¶ 3(a). 
 195. See id. at ¶¶ 3-4. 
 196. Notice of Motion, Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n of S. Afr. v. President of the 
Republic of S. Afr., Case No. 4183/98 (High Court of South Africa 1998) 
available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/pharmasuit.html (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2003). 
 197. The Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, No. 
90 of 1997, gave the South African Health Minister power to define 
“prescribed conditions” for the supply of “more affordable medicines” in 
“certain circumstances.”  See Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n of S. Afr., at ¶ 2.1.  One 
practical effect of the Amendment Act was to give the Health Minister the 
power to enact parallel importation of patented drugs.  See Sarah Joseph, 
Pharmaceutical Corporations and Access to Drugs: The “Fourth Wave” of 
Corporate Human Rights Scrutiny, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 425, 442 (2003).  The 
amendment also gave the Health Minister the power to prescribe conditions 
under which compulsory licenses could be granted.  See Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n of 
S. Afr., at ¶ 2.2.  The South African government already had the ability to 
grant compulsory licenses pursuant to the Patents Act of 1978.  Joseph at 442.  
The Amendment Act, however, increased the discretion of the government to 
determine the conditions under which compulsory licenses would be granted.  
See Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n of S. Afr., at ¶¶ 2.1 & 2.2. 
The pharmaceutical manufacturers alleged that Amendment Act authorized 
the government to deprive pharmaceutical patent holders of their intellectual 
property, or to appropriate that property without providing compensation.  See 
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pharmaceutical manufacturers settled their suit in April 2001, 
in light of the South African government’s agreement to consult 
a pharmaceutical working group before implementing its new 
laws.198  The pharmaceutical group’s decision to drop their 
complaint was likely prompted in part by strong global protest 
to the suit.  The Commission on Human Rights’ impending 
adoption of Resolution 2001/33 (which endorsed Brazil’s 
compulsory licensing program) and Sub-Commission Resolution 
2000/7 may also have contributed to the decision to drop the 
South African suit.199 
D. RESPONSE OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS 
Three months after the adoption of Sub-Commission 
Resolution 2000/7, the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights held a day of discussion in November 2000 to 
consider whether TRIPS potentially conflicts with human 
rights norms in the ICESCR.200  The day of discussion was 
 
Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n of S. Afr., at ¶ 2.3.  Such a taking was alleged to violate 
Section 25 of the South African Constitution, which states that “[p]roperty 
may be expropriated only . . . for a public purpose or in the public interest, and 
subject to compensation”.  CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, Act 108 
of 1996, Chapter 2, § 25, part 2 (1996), available at 
http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/ constitution/saconst.html (last visited Oct. 
23, 2003).  Further, the pharmaceutical manufacturers alleged that the 
parallel importation authorization violated TRIPS’ Article 27 prohibition on 
discrimination with respect to importation or local production of patented 
products.  See Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n of S. Afr., at ¶ 2.4. 
 198. The Minister of Health agreed to invite a working party from the 
pharmaceutical industry to consult with the government in formation of 
policies, legislation, and regulations that would be enacted to implement the 
Amendment Act.  The government, however, made explicit mention of TRIPS’ 
allowance  for the  adoption of measures necessary to protect public health and 
broaden access to medicines.  Joint Statement of Understanding Between the 
Republic of S. Afr. and the Applicants, in the matter between: The Pharm. 
Mfrs. Ass’n of S. Afr. v. The President of the Republic of S. Afr., ¶ 2 (April 19, 
2001), available at http://www.efpia.org/3_press/20010419.htm (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2003). 
 199. The South African pharmaceutical manufacturers settled their suit on 
April 19, 2001.  The Commission on Human Rights adopted Resolution 
2001/33 on April 23, 2001.  Commission on Human Rights Res. 2001/33, supra 
note 192.  It seems plausible to think that the pharmaceutical manufacturers 
were tracking the buildup to Resolution 2001/33’s adoption, and understood 
that a U.N. endorsement of compulsory licensing would reflect badly on the 
pharmaceutical manufacturers’ suit. 
 200. Report on the Twenty-second, Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth 
Sessions, ESCOR, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 22nd-
24th Sess., Supp. No. 2, ¶ 578, U.N. Doc. E/2001/22 and E/C.12/2000/21 (2000) 
[hereinafter Report on the 22-24 Sessions]. 
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intended to lay a foundation for the eventual adoption of a 
general comment on the relationship between intellectual 
property rights and human rights standards.201 
The discussion relied heavily on a discussion paper 
prepared by Audrey Chapman, a representative of the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science.202  Peter 
Prove, the LWF lobbyist who provided the initial impetus for 
the Sub-Commission to consider adopting Resolution 2000/7, 
also contributed to the discussion.203  In addition, background 
papers and commentary on cultural property and traditional 
knowledge rights played a prominent part in the discussion.204 
Chapman’s presentation to the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights stated that the creation of the WTO 
and TRIPS had strengthened the world intellectual property 
regime in a way that was inconsistent with human rights 
norms.205  She further stated that the international intellectual 
property regime had “demonstrated detrimental effects to the 
rights enshrined in [ICESCR].”206  She specifically noted that 
the current intellectual property regime did not apply to 
indigenous creations and knowledge, negatively affected the 
right to health by reducing the availability of pharmaceuticals, 
and threatened the right to food by extending broad plant 
patent protection to a few agricultural companies that hold 
 
 201. Id. at ¶ 579. 
 202. Approaching Intellectual Property as a Human Right: Obligations 
Related to Article 15(1)(c), ESCOR, Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 24th Sess., Provisional Agenda item 3, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/2000/12 (2000) (discussion paper submitted by Dr. Audrey R. 
Chapman). 
 203. Report on the 22-24 Sessions, see supra note 200, at ¶ 629.  Also 
present was Miloon Kothari, representing the International NGO Committee 
on Human Rights in International Trade and Investment.  (INCHRITI.)  Id. at 
¶ 630.  That NGO was one of groups that jointly presented the statement to 
the Sub-Commission that eventually resulted in the adoption of Resolution 
2000/7.  See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 204. Background papers were submitted by a Swiss scholar and by the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission.  Protection of cultural 
property: an individual and collective right, ESCOR, Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 24th Sess., Provisional Agenda item 3, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/2000/16 (2000) (background paper submitted by Patrice Meyer-Bisch); 
Protecting the rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional 
knowledge, ESCOR, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 24th 
Sess., Provisional Agenda item 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/17 (2000) 
(background paper submitted by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission). 
 205. Report on the 22-24 Sessions, supra note 200, at ¶ 587. 
 206. Id. 
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patents on the genomes of important global crops.207  The 
Economic and Social Committee’s Chairperson concluded the 
discussion by reiterating the Committee’s intent to draft a 
general comment on intellectual property and human rights.208 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
has not yet adopted a General Comment yet.  Instead, the 
Committee drafted a less visible and less ambitious statement 
that outlines their concerns about the effect of intellectual 
property regimes on key human rights principles derived from 
ICESCR.209  The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights stated that intellectual property has “a social function” 
and “should serve the objective of human well-being, to which 
international human rights instruments give legal 
expression.”210  In addition, “[h]uman rights are fundamental, 
inalienable and universal entitlements . . . whereas intellectual 
property rights . . . are instrumental . . . generally of a 
temporary nature, and can be revoked, licensed or assigned to 
someone else.”211  The Committee also asserted that “[w]hile 
the State holds the primary duty to respect, protect and fulfil 
[sic] human rights, other actors, including non-State actors and 
international organizations, carry obligations, which must be 
subject to scrutiny.”212 
The Committee elaborated on the most important 
obligations imposed by ICESCR.  While acknowledging that 
ICESCR allows for “progressive realization” of some of the 
ICESCR’s objectives, the Committee reminded States parties of 
“various obligations which have immediate effect, including 
core obligations.”213  Core obligations require States parties to 
“‘ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum 
essential levels of each of the rights’ enunciated in 
[ICESCR]”.214  In particular, the Committee “emphasize[d] that 
any intellectual property regime that makes it more difficult for 
a State party to comply with its core obligations in relation to 
 
 207. Report on the 22-24 Sessions, supra note 200, at ¶ 587. 
 208. Id. at ¶ 635. 
 209. Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the Covenant, 
supra note 11, at ¶ 2. 
 210. Id. at ¶ 4. 
 211. Id. at ¶ 6 (citing High Commissioner’s TRIPS Report, supra note 158, 
at ¶ 14). 
 212. Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the Covenant, 
supra note 11, at ¶ 10. 
 213. Id. at ¶ 11. 
 214. Id. at ¶ 12 (citing The nature of States parties obligations, supra note 
11). 
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health, food, [or] education . . . is inconsistent with the legally 
binding obligations of the State party.”215 
In addition to States’ core obligations in relation to health, 
food, and education, the Committee noted that ICESCR “sets 
out the need to balance the protection of public and private 
interests in knowledge.”216  As the Committee explained: 
On the one hand, article 15.1(a) and (b) [of ICESCR] recognizes the 
right of everyone to take part in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits 
of scientific progress and its applications.  On the other hand, Article 
15.1(c) recognizes the right of everyone to benefit from the protection 
of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, 
literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author.217 
The Committee urged States to “strike a balance between 
those concurrent Covenant provisions” in developing 
intellectual property regimes.218  The Committee referenced 
with approval the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health, which “recognizes that intellectual property 
protection is important for the development of new medicines, 
but at the same time also recognizes the concerns about its 
effect on prices.”219 
In summary, the Committee’s statement reminded States 
parties of the “importance [of] the integration of international 
human rights norms into the enactment and interpretation of 
intellectual property law” in a balanced manner that protects 
public and private interests in knowledge without infringing on 
 
 215. Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the Covenant, 
supra note 11, at ¶ 12.  Article 11 of the International Covenant recognizes a 
right to food.  See infra part IV.E.1; see also Committee’s General Comment No. 
12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11), U.N. Commission on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 29th Sess., at ¶ 1 (1999). 
Article 12 of the International Covenant recognizes the right to the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health.  See Committee’s General 
Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 
12), U.N. Commission on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 22nd Sess., at 
¶¶ 1-2 (2000). 
Article 13 of the International Covenant recognizes the right to education, 
which shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.  See Committee’s General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education 
(Art. 13), U.N. Commission on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 21st 
Sess., at ¶¶ 1-2 (1999). 
 216. Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Statement of the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Committee on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights, 27th Sess., Agenda Item 3, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/15 
(2001). 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id.  For further discussion of the Doha Declaration, see infra part V. 
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fundamental human rights.220  When close questions arise 
about where the appropriate balance lies, States should draw a 
balance that maintains the integrity of human rights. 
E. CONTINUING EFFORTS OF THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
1.  Report on Globalization 
The High Commissioner’s Report on the impact of TRIPS 
on human rights, discussed at Section IV(A) above, was the 
first of a triad of reports, prompted by the Sub-Commission’s 
resolution and proposed by the Office of the High 
Commissioner, concerning human rights and trade.  The second 
report examined the impact of globalization on the enjoyment 
of human rights by outlining issues that arise when “the 
liberalization of agricultural trade is viewed from a human 
rights perspective.”221  Specifically, the report examined the 
implementation of the 1994 WTO Agreement on Agriculture to 
highlight some of the problems stemming from the 
liberalization of agricultural trade. 
The High Commissioner’s report reminded WTO States of 
their obligations under international human rights 
instruments.  In particular, the report noted that all WTO 
States are subject to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and that 112 of the 144 WTO States have ratified 
ICESCR.222  Both instruments recognize the right of everyone 
to have an adequate standard of living, which includes the 
right to food.223  Article 2 of ICESCR binds parties to “take 
steps, individually and through international assistance and co-
operation . . . with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant”.224  
Article 28 of the Universal Declaration states that “[e]veryone 
 
 220. Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Statement of the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 216, at ¶ 18. 
 221. Globalization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights: 
Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights submitted in accordance 
with Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/32, ESCOR, Commission 
on Human Rights, 58th Sess., Provisional Agenda item 10, at ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2002/54 (2002). 
 222. Id. at ¶ 10. 
 223. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), at 
art. 25, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/index.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2003); see also 
ICESCR, supra note 4, at art. 11. 
 224. ICESCR, supra note 4, at art. 2. 
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is entitled to a social and international order in which the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully 
realized.”225  By reminding WTO States of their obligations 
under these instruments, the High Commissioner’s report 
indicated that WTO States have a binding obligation to protect 
and promote the right to food, even as they seek to liberalize 
trade in agriculture.226 
The High Commissioner’s report concluded that the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) generates both positive and 
negative human rights results.  On the positive side, the AoA 
increases transparency and accountability in international 
agricultural trade, which the High Commissioner characterized 
as an “important first step . . . towards a more fair 
international trading system.”227 
The High Commissioner’s report also highlighted some of 
the potential human rights issues that might arise as a result 
of global trade liberalization in agriculture.  First, 
liberalization has encouraged farm consolidation.228  Although 
this trend has increased productivity and competition, it has 
also marginalized small farmers and farm laborers, and 
exposed communities to increases in food prices.229  Second, 
trade liberalization has forced some developing countries into a 
chronic system of net food importation.  The resultant payment 
imbalances could eventually hinder developing nations’ ability 
to realize their right to development.230  Third, agricultural 
price fluctuations created by trade liberalization could 
negatively impact some nations’ ability to finance development, 
or even affect a state’s ability to guarantee availability of 
 
 225. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 223, at art. 28. 
 226. See Globalization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human 
Rights: Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 221, at 
¶ 10. 
 227. Id. at ¶ 27; cf ¶¶ 34-39 (demonstrating the negative affects of 
liberalization). 
 228. Id. at ¶ 35. 
 229. Id.  For example, the High Commissioner’s Report references a U.N. 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) study that showed an adverse effect 
of agricultural trade liberalization on 300,000 potato and onion farmers in Sri 
Lanka.  The same study indicated that consolidation of Brazilian dairy farms 
were squeezing out traditional cooperatives.  Id. (citing Agriculture, Trade and 
Food Security Issues and Options in the WTO Negotiations from the 
Perspective of Developing Countries, FAO Commodities and Trade Division, 
Country Case Studies, Vol. II, at 25 (2000)). 
 230. See Globalization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human 
Rights: Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 221, at 
¶ 37. 
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food.231 
2.  Report on Liberalization of Trade in Services 
In the summer of 2002, the Office of the High 
Commissioner submitted the final report in its tripartite 
examination of the interaction of trade and human rights.  The 
report focused on the human rights effect of liberalization of 
trade in services.  In the same way that its report on 
globalization used a specific agreement (the AoA) as a case 
study, the High Commissioner’s report on trade in services 
examined the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
The report again reminded WTO States of their obligations 
under ICESCR and the Universal Declaration to promote the 
right to food.  The report also noted the right to development.232  
Since liberalization of trade in services encompasses a wider 
range of activities than agricultural trade services, the report 
extended the scope of State obligations to include the rights to 
health, education, water, and labor.233  The High Commissioner 
characterized States as the “duty bearer[s] for human 
rights,”234 and therefore asserted that States have an 
affirmative obligation to (1) monitor the realization of human 
rights, (2) develop domestic trade policies that promote human 
rights objectives and (3) regulate extra-national third party 
activities that affect human rights in the State.235 
The High Commissioner’s report stressed that 
liberalization of trade in services can provide a positive effect 
on human rights.236  But, the report also noted that the 
liberalization of trade in services, without adequate 
governmental regulation and proper assessment of its effects, 
can also have undesirable effects.237  Therefore, “[t]he key 
 
 231. Id. at ¶ 38. 
 232. See supra notes 222-226 and accompanying text. 
 233. Liberalization of Trade in Services and Human Rights: Report of the 
High Commissioner, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, 54th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4, at ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9 (2002). 
 234. Id. at ¶ 10. 
 235. To this end, the High Commissioner encouraged State ministries and 
agencies to conduct human rights assessments that would promote popular 
participation and consultation with the people affected by trade liberalization.  
The High Commissioner also advocated for increased “transparency and 
accountability” with respect to the methods of assessment and trade 
negotiations. Id. at ¶¶ 10-13. 
 236. Id. at ¶ 39. 
 237. Id. 
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question from a human rights perspective is not whether 
liberalization does or does not promote human rights; rather, it 
is how to determine the right form and pace of liberalization to 
ensure the protection of human rights and how to reverse 
policies that are unsuccessful.”238  The report indicated that 
effective state regulation and oversight, buttressed by 
international assistance to developing countries, is integral to 
controlling the pace and form of liberalization.239 
The High Commissioner noted with approval GATS’ 
recognition of the principle of non-discrimination.240  In the 
context of trade law, non-discrimination means equal 
treatment for national and foreign service providers alike.  The 
non-discrimination principle can be extended, however, to 
encompass the human rights view of non-discrimination in 
terms of race, color, sex, etc.241  The High Commissioner also 
endorsed GATS’ exceptions for the purposes of protecting public 
morals, as well as human, animal and plant life, and the 
protection of individual privacy.242 
V. PROGRESS 
Sub-Commission Resolution 2000/7 encouraged a series of 
investigations into the human rights implications of 
international intellectual property protection and trade 
liberalization.  The heightened global awareness about the 
human rights implications of intellectual property and global 
trade has produced some positive results.  Most significantly, 
the WTO Ministerial Conference at Doha in November 2001 
responded to several of those human rights concerns. 
The Ministerial Conference adopted a special declaration 
 
 238. Id. at ¶ 50. 
 239. Id.  The High Commissioner specifically stressed the need for 
regulation that would implement effective competition policies and corporate 
transparency, as well as national policies reflecting a commitment to providing 
universal service.  The High Commissioner stated that “[i]n human rights 
terms, the need to regulate . . . is in fact a duty to regulate . . . to ‘fulfil’ [sic] 
human rights requires States to take appropriate legislative, administrative, 
budgetary, judicial and other measures towards the full realization of such 
rights.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 240. Id. at ¶ 59. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at ¶ 63.  The High Commissioner noted that these protections are 
“familiar themes to human rights law”, and stated that although “a human 
rights approach would place the promotion of human rights at the centre of 
the objectives of GATS rather than as permitted exceptions, these links 
nonetheless provide an entry point for a human rights approach to 
liberalization”.  Id. 
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that explicitly addressed the issue of the interaction of TRIPS 
and public health concerns.  The declaration stated that “the 
[TRIPS] Agreement can and should be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to 
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to 
medicines for all.”243  To that end, the declaration reminded 
WTO States that TRIPS recognizes the right to grant 
compulsory licenses, as well as the ability to implement 
parallel importation mechanisms.244  Furthermore, the 
declaration noted that “public health crises, including those 
relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency.”245  It is these circumstances 
which enable States to initiate compulsory licensing under 
TRIPS Article 31.246 
The Ministerial Conference’s declaration instructed the 
Council for TRIPS (a TRIPS review body) to take into account 
the issues pertaining to traditional knowledge and folklore 
when reviewing TRIPS’ exclusivity requirements.247  
Furthermore, the declaration stated that “special and 
differential treatment for developing countries shall be an 
integral part of . . . enabl[ing] developing countries to 
effectively take account of their development needs, including 
food security and rural development.”248  In addition, the 
declaration recognized the “particular vulnerability of the least-
developed countries and the special structural difficulties they 
face in the global economy,” and committed the WTO to 
“addressing the marginalization of least-developed countries in 
international trade and to improving their effective 
participation in the multilateral trading system.”249  Further, 
the declaration noted that “under WTO rules no country should 
be prevented from taking measures for the protection of 
human, animal or plant life or health . . . subject to the 
requirement that they . . . are otherwise in accordance with the 
 
 243. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Doha 
Ministerial Conference, 4th Sess., at ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (01-
5860) (2001), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration]. 
 244. Id. at ¶ 5(b) and (d). 
 245. Id. at ¶ 5(c). 
 246. WTO, supra note 29, at art. 31. 
 247. Ministerial Declaration, supra note 243, at ¶19. 
 248. Id. at ¶ 13. 
 249. Id. at ¶ 3. 
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provisions of the WTO Agreements.”250  The declaration also 
reaffirmed the right of WTO members to regulate the supply of 
services under GATS,251 and confirmed the WTO’s 
responsibility to make its operations transparent and 
democratic.252 
The United States’ initial responses to the Doha 
Declaration’s objectives have been mixed.  With respect to trade 
liberalization, the United States submitted to the WTO a 
proposal suggesting the removal of international regulatory 
procedures for financial and insurance services, and also 
recommended lowering trade restrictions in the 
telecommunications, energy, and environmental services.253  In 
addition, the Bush administration promised to contribute $1 
million to the “Doha Development Agenda Trust Fund, [which] 
aim[s] at building the capacity for developing countries to 
participate in the full range of WTO negotiations and activities 
agreed to in Doha.”254  In the agricultural realm, the United 
States is leading a drive to eliminate export subsidies within 
five years.255 
The United States position on measures designed to 
provide affordable medication to treat AIDS and other 
epidemics has been more ambiguous.  The Doha Declaration set 
a December 2002 deadline by which the Council for TRIPS was 
to have reached an agreement on a policy under which least-
developed WTO Members could import generically 
manufactured copies of patented pharmaceuticals.256  The 
Council for TRIPS failed to meet that deadline amid reports of 
U.S. objections to the number of diseases and eligible importing 
nations that some WTO Members wanted to include in the 
scheme for relaxing pharmaceutical patent protection.257  In the 
 
 250. Id. at ¶ 6. 
 251. Id. at ¶ 7. 
 252. Id. at ¶ 10. 
 253. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, 
United States Proposals for Liberalizing Trade in Services (July 1, 2002), 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2002/07/02-63.pdf (last visited Jan. 
23, 2003). 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, supra note 
243, at ¶ 6. 
 257. RAYMOND W. COPSON, AIDS IN AFRICA, at CRS-1, available at 
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/hiv/ib10050aidsaf.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 
2003).  The U.S. State Department reported that some (unspecified) WTO 
Members sought to allow wealthier WTO Members onto the list of “poor 
country epidemic” nations that were meant to be the focus of the Doha 
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wake of that failure, the United States proposed an exception to 
TRIPS Article 31 that would allow least-developed nations with 
health epidemics to import generically manufactured drugs 
from developing nations that currently provide patent 
protection for the pharmaceuticals in question.258  While the 
U.S. proposal indicated a willingness to ease patent protection 
in some cases, it did not give explicit guidance as to which 
specific drugs could be manufactured.259 
 
Declaration’s emphasis on relaxations of patent protection allowable pursuant 
to TRIPS Article 31.  In addition, the State Department reported that some 
WTO Members sought to expand the classes of drugs available for generic 
manufacture and import to include drugs not designed for the treatment of 
epidemic diseases (e.g., Viagra).  See News Release, U.S. Department of State, 
International Information Programs, U.S. Announces Interim HIV/AIDS Plan 
for Poor Countries, Dec. 20, 2002, at 
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/wto/02122002.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 
2003). 
 258. TRIPS currently allows WTO Members to use a compulsory license to 
import a generically manufactured drug from another country provided that 
the exporting country has not granted a patent on that drug.  The problem is 
that TRIPS Article 31(f) currently prohibits a WTO Member that has granted 
patent protection from generically producing a drug for export, even if the 
importing country has a health epidemic and lacks the domestic infrastructure 
to manufacture generic drugs.  The U.S. proposal envisions either a dispute 
resolution moratorium or a waiver of TRIPS Article 31(f) so that developing 
nations with the capacity to produce generic drugs could export those drugs to 
a least developed nation, even when the exporting nation has granted patent 
protection.  The U.S. proposal also takes pains to note that exporting nations 
would be expected to “ensure that the medicines . . . are not diverted from the 
Member for which they were intended, either by being diverted to other 
markets or by leaking onto the domestic market of the exporting Member.”  
Furthermore, the U.S. proposal indicates that an importing Member might 
still owe some discounted measure of compensation to the patent holder 
(although the licensing fees paid to the patent holder by the exporting nation 
would be used to offset the total amount of compensation owed by the 
importing Member).  News Release, U.S. Department of State, International 
Information Programs, A Second Communication from the United States of 
America Relating to Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, at 
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/wto/tripshealth020625.htm (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2003). 
 259. The U.S. proposal suggests that any WTO Member with least-
developed nation status be presumed to have insufficient infrastructure to 
produce its own generic pharmaceuticals, and thus would be allowed to import 
generic drugs under the proposed exception to TRIPS Article 31(f).  Developing 
Members not designated as “high income countries” would also be eligible to 
import generic drugs (thus Barbados, Brunei, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Israel, 
Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Macao, Malta, Qatar, Singapore, Slovenia, Taiwan and 
the United Arab Emirates would not be allowed to import generic 
pharmaceuticals even in cases of health epidemics).  The U.S. proposal does 
provide a list of potential diseases that could qualify a Member for Article 31 
exception (including ebola, African trypanosomiasis, cholera, dengue, typhoid, 
2003] A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH 45 
 
 
 
On August 30, 2003, the WTO General Council for TRIPS 
resolved the dispute about implementing the Doha Declaration 
by adopting a decision which essentially permitted a patent 
exception rule to allow countries to produce medicine for export 
in order to fulfill public health needs in countries that do not 
have production capacities.260The decision dealt with U.S. 
concerns that the patent exception rule would lead to the 
distribution of generic medicines for non-infectious diseases 
and with concerns about the re-export of such medicines to 
other markets.261 
 
and typhus fevers); it does not specify which pharmaceuticals could be 
generically produced.  See U.S. Announces Interim HIV/AIDS Plan for Poor 
Countries, supra note 257. 
 260. Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and public health, TRIPS: Council for TRIPS, WTO Doc., 
WT/L/540, at ¶ 6 (Aug. 30, 2003), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm (last visited 
Sept. 1, 2003). 
 261. It accomplishes this goal by imposing upon importing nation the 
obligation to “take reasonable measures within their means. . . to prevent re-
exportation of the products that have actually been imported into their 
territories under the system.”  To the extent that developing nations lack the 
capacity to enforce the re-exportation restrictions, they are authorized to call 
upon developed country members to aid in enforcement.  Id. at ¶ 4. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Sub-Commission Resolution 2000/7 expressed concern for 
the human rights implications of trends in world trade and 
globalization.  By adopting the resolution, the Sub-Commission 
thus played a role in a broader effort to develop a human rights 
approach to intellectual property protection, world trade, and 
globalization. 
 
